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This paper provides a model of the interaction between risk-management practices and market liquidity.
On one hand, tighter risk management reduces the maximum position an institution can take, thus
the amount of liquidity it can offer to the market. On the other hand, risk managers can take into account
that lower liquidity amplifies the effective risk of a position by lengthening the time it takes to sell
it. The main result of the paper is that a feedback effect can arise: tighter risk management reduces
liquidity, which in turn leads to tighter risk management, etc. This can help explain sudden drops in
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This paper provides a model of the interaction between risk-management practices and
market liquidity. Our main ﬁnding is that a feedback eﬀect can arise: tighter risk manage-
ment leads to market illiquidity, and this illiquidity further tightens risk management.
Risk management plays a central role in institutional investors’ allocation of capital to
trading. For instance, a risk manager may limit a trading desk’s one-day 99% value at
risk (VaR) to $1 million. This means that the trading desk must choose a position such
that, over the following day, its value drops no more than $1 million with 99% probability.
Risk management thus helps control an institution’s use of capital while limiting default
risk, and helps mitigate agency problems. Jorion (2000, page xxiii) states that VaR “is now
increasingly used to allocate capital across traders, business units, products, and even to the
whole institution.”
We do not focus on the beneﬁts of risk management within an institution adopting such
controls, but, rather, on the aggregate eﬀects of such practices on liquidity and asset prices.
An institution may beneﬁt from tightening its risk management and restricting its security
position, but as a consequence it cannot provide as much liquidity to others. We show that,
if everyone uses a tight risk management, then market liquidity is lowered in that it takes
longer to ﬁnd a buyer with unused risk-bearing capacity, and, since liquidity is priced, prices
1fall.
Not only does risk management aﬀect liquidity, but liquidity can also aﬀect risk-management
practices. For instance, Bank for International Settlements (2001, page 15) states that “For
the internal risk management, a number of institutions are exploring the use of liquidity
adjusted-VaR, in which the holding periods in the risk assessment are adjusted to account
for market liquidity, in particular by the length of time required to unwind positions.” For
instance, if liquidation is expected to take two days, a two-day VaR might be used instead
of a one-day VaR. Since a security’s risk over two days is greater than over one day, this
means that a trader must choose a smaller position to satisfy his liquidity-adjusted value at
risk (LVaR) constraint. One motivation for this constraint is that, if an institution needs to
sell, its maximum loss before the completion of the sale is limited by the LVaR.
The main result of the paper is that subjecting traders to an LVaR gives rise to a multiplier
eﬀect: tighter risk management leads to more restricted positions, hence longer expected
selling times, implying higher risk over the expected selling period, which further tightens
the risk management, and so on. This snowballing feedback between liquidity and risk
management can help explain why liquidity can suddenly drop. We show that this spiraling
illiquidity can arise if volatility rises, or if more agents face reduced risk-bearing capacity —
for instance, because of investor redemptions, losses, or increased risk aversion.
Our link between liquidity and risk management is a testable prediction. While no formal
empirical evidence is available, to our knowledge, our prediction is consistent with anecdotal
evidence on ﬁnancial market crises. For example, in August 1998 several traders lost money
due to a default of Russian bonds and, simultaneously, market volatility increased. As a
2result, the (L)VaR of many investment banks and other institutions increased. To bring risk
back in line, many investment banks reportedly asked traders to reduce positions, leading
to falling prices and lower liquidity. These market moves exacerbated the risk-management
problems, fueling the crisis in a similar manner to the one modelled here.
We capture these eﬀects by extending the search model for ﬁnancial securities of Duﬃe,
Gˆ arleanu, and Pedersen (2005, 2007) (DGP). This framework of time-consuming search is
well suited for modeling liquidity-based risk management as it provides a natural framework
for studying endogenous selling times. While DGP relied on exogenous position limits, we
endogenize positions based on a risk-management constraint, and consider both a simple
and a liquidity-adjusted VaR. Hence, we solve the ﬁxed-point problem of jointly calculating
endogenous positions given the risk-management constraint and computing the equilibrium
(L)VaR given the endogenous positions that determine selling times and price volatility.
Weill (2007) considers another extension of DGP in which marketmaker liquidity provision
is limited by capital constraints. Our multiplier eﬀect is similar to that of Brunnermeier and
Pedersen (2006) who show that liquidity and traders’ margin requirements can be mutually
reinforcing.
1 Model
The economy has two securities: a “liquid” security with risk-free return r (i.e. a “money-
market account”), and a risky illiquid security. The risky security has a dividend-rate process
X and a price P(X), which is determined in equilibrium. The dividend rate is L´ evy with
3ﬁnite variance. It has a constant drift normalized to zero, Et (X(t + T) − X(t)) = 0, and a
volatility σX > 0, i.e.,
(1) Vart (X(t + T) − X(t)) = σ
2
X T.
Examples include Brownian motions, Poisson processes, and sums of these.
The economy is populated by a continuum of agents who are risk neutral and inﬁnitely
lived, have a time-preference rate equal to the risk-free interest rate r > 0, and must keep
their wealth bounded from below. Each agent is characterized by an intrinsic type i ∈ {h,l},
which is a Markov chain, independent across agents, and switching from l (“low”) to h
(“high”) with intensity λu, and back with intensity λd. An agent of type i holding θt shares
of the asset incurs a holding cost of δ > 0 per share and per unit of time if he violates his
risk-management constraint
(2) vart (θt [P(Xt+τ) − P(Xt)]) ≤ (σ
i)
2,
where σi is the risk-bearing capacity, deﬁned by σh = ¯ σ > 0 and σl = 0. The low risk-bearing
capacity of the low-type agents can be interpreted as a need for more stable earnings, hedging
reasons to reduce a position, high ﬁnancing costs, or a need for cash (e.g., an asset manager
whose investors redeem capital).1
We use this constraint as a parsimonious way of capturing risk constraints, such as the
1An interesting extension of our model would consider the direct beneﬁt of tighter risk management,
which could be captured by a lower λd.
4very popular VaR constraint,2 which are used by most ﬁnancial institutions. Our results
are robust in that they only rely on two natural properties of the measure of risk: the risk
measure increases with the size of the security position and the length of the time period τ
over which the risk is assessed. While the constraint is not endogenized in the model, we
note that its wide use in the ﬁnancial world is probably due to agency problems, default
risk, and the need to allocate scarce capital.
We consider two types of risk management: (a) “simple risk management,” in which the
variance of the position in (2) is computed over a ﬁxed time horizon τ, and (b) “liquidity-
adjusted risk management,” in which the variance is computed over the time required for
selling the asset to an unconstrained buyer, which will be a random equilibrium quantity.
Because agents are risk neutral and we are interested in a steady-state equilibrium, we
restrict attention to equilibria in which, at any given time and state of the world, an agent
holds either 0 or ¯ θ units of the asset, where ¯ θ is the largest position that satisﬁes (2) with
σi = ¯ σ, taking the prices and search times as given.3 Hence, the set of agent types is
T = {ho,hn,lo,ln}, with the letters “h” and “l” designating the agent’s current intrinsic
risk-bearing state as high or low, respectively, and with “o” or “n” indicating whether the
agent currently owns ¯ θ shares or none, respectively. We let µζ(t) denote the fraction at time
2A VaR constraint stipulates that Pr(−θ[P(Xt+τ) − P(Xt)] ≥ V aR) ≤ π for some risk limit VaR and
some conﬁdence level π. If X is a Brownian motion, this is the same as (2). We note that rather than
considering only price risk, we could alternatively consider the risk of the gains process (i.e., including
dividend risk) Gt,τ = P(X(t + τ)) − P(X(t)) +
R t+τ
t X(s)ds. This yields qualitatively similar results (and
quantitatively similar for many reasonable parameters since dividend risk is orders of magnitude smaller
than price risk over a small time period).
3Note that the existence of such an equilibrium requires that the risk limit ¯ σ be not too small relative to
the total supply Θ, a condition that we assume throughout.
5t of agents of type ζ ∈ T . These fractions add up to 1 and markets must clear:
1 = µho + µhn + µlo + µln (3)
Θ = ¯ θ(µho + µlo), (4)
where Θ > 0 is the total supply of shares per investor.
Central to our analysis is the notion that the risky security is not perfectly liquid, in the
sense that an agent can only trade it when she ﬁnds a counterparty. Every agent ﬁnds a
potential counterparty, selected randomly from the set of all agents, with intensity λ, where
λ ≥ 0 is an exogenous parameter characterizing the market liquidity for the asset. Hence,
the intensity of ﬁnding a type-ζ investor is λµζ, that is, the search intensity multiplied by
the fraction of investors of that type. When two agents meet, they bargain over the price,
with the seller having bargaining power q ∈ [0,1].
This model of illiquidity captures directly the search that characterizes over-the-counter
(OTC) markets. In these markets, traders must ﬁnd an appropriate counterparty, which
can be time consuming. Trading delays also arise due to time spent gathering information,
reaching trading decisions, mobilizing capital, etc. Hence, trading delays are commonplace
and, therefore, the model can also capture features of other markets such as specialist and
electronic limit-order-book markets, although these markets are, of course, distinct from
OTC markets.
62 Equilibrium Risk Management, Liquidity, and Prices
We now proceed to derive the steady-state equilibrium agent fractions µ, the maximum
holding ¯ θ, and the price P. Naturally, low-type owners lo want to sell and high-type non-
owners hn want to buy, which leads to
0 = −2λµhn(t)µlo(t) − λuµlo(t) + λdµho(t) (5)
and three more such steady-state equations. Equation (5) states that the change in the
fraction of lo agents has three components, corresponding to the three terms on the right
hand side: First, whenever an lo agent meets an hn investor, he sells his asset and is no
longer an lo agent. Second, whenever the intrinsic type of a lo agent switches to high, he
becomes an ho agent. Third, ho agents can switch type and become lo. Duﬃe, Gˆ arleanu,
and Pedersen (2005) show that, taking ¯ θ as ﬁxed, there is a unique stable steady-state mass
distribution as long as ¯ θ ≥ Θ. Here, agents’ positions ¯ θ are endogenous and depend on µ, so
that we must calculate a ﬁxed point.
Agents take the steady-state distribution µ as ﬁxed when they derive their optimal strate-
gies and utilities for remaining lifetime consumption, as well as the bargained price P. The
utility of an agent depends on his current type, ζ(t) ∈ T , (i.e., whether he is a high or a
low type and whether he owns zero or ¯ θ shares), the current dividend X(t), and the wealth
W(t) in his bank account:
Vζ(X(t),Wt) = Wt + 1(ζ∈{ho,lo})
¯ θX(t)
r
+ ¯ θvζ, (6)
7where the type-dependent utility coeﬃcients vζ are to be determined. With q the bargaining
power of the seller, bilateral Nash bargaining yields the price:
P ¯ θ = (Vlo − Vln)(1 − q) + (Vho − Vhn) q . (7)





for a constant p to be determined. The value-function coeﬃcients vζ and p are given by a
set of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations, stated and solved in the appendix. The appendix
contains all the proofs.
Proposition 1 If the risk-limit ¯ σ is suﬃciently large, there exists an equilibrium with hold-
ings 0 and ¯ θ that satisfy the risk management constraint (2) with equality for low- and
high-type agents, respectively. With simple risk management, the equilibrium is unique and







With liquidity-adjusted risk management, ¯ θ depends on the equilibrium fraction of potential
buyers µhn and satisﬁes












r(1 − q) + λd + 2λµlo(1 − q)
r + λd + 2λµlo(1 − q) + λu + 2λµhnq
,
where the fractions of agents µ depend on the type of risk management.
These results are intuitive. The “position limit” ¯ θ increases in the risk limit ¯ σ and decreases
in the asset volatility and in the square root of the VaR period length, which is τ under
simple risk management and (2λµhn)−1 under liquidity-adjusted risk management. In the
latter case, position limits increase in the search intensity λ and in the fraction of eligible
buyers µhn.
The price equals the present value of dividends, Xt
r , minus a discount for illiquidity.
Naturally, the liquidity discount is larger if there are more low-type owners in equilibrium
(µlo is larger) and fewer high-type non-owners ready to buy (µhn is smaller).
Of the equilibria obtaining with liquidity-adjusted risk management, we concentrate on
the ones that are stable, in the sense that increasing ¯ θ marginally would result in equilibrium
quantities violating the VaR constraint (2). Conversely, an equilibrium is unstable if a
marginal change in holdings that violates the constraint would result in the equilibrium
adjusting so that the constraint is not violated. If an equilibrium exists, then a stable
equilibrium exists. Indeed, the equilibrium with the largest ¯ θ is stable and has the highest
welfare among all equilibria.
The main result of the paper characterizes the equilibrium connection between liquidity
and risk management:




















































Figure 1: The eﬀects of dividend volatility on equilibrium seller search times (left panel) and
prices (right panel) with, respectively simple (dashed line) and liquidity-adjusted (solid line)
risk management.
Proposition 2 Suppose that ¯ σ is large enough for existence of an equilibrium. Consider a
stable equilibrium with liquidity-adjusted risk management and let τ = 1
2λµhn, which means
that the equilibrium allocations and price are the same with simple risk management.
Consider any combination of the conditions (a) higher dividend volatility σX, (b) lower
risk limit ¯ σ, (c) lower meeting intensity λ, (d) lower switching intensity λu to the high risk-
bearing state, and (e) higher switching intensity λd to the low risk-bearing state. Then, (i)
the equilibrium position ¯ θ decreases, (ii) expected search times for selling increase, and (iii)
prices decrease. All three eﬀects are larger with liquidity-adjusted risk management.
To see the intuition for these results, consider ﬁrst the impact of a higher dividend
volatility. This makes the risk-management constraint tighter, inducing agents to reduce
their positions and spreading securities among more agents, thus leaving a smaller fraction
of agents with unused risk-bearing capacity. Hence, sellers’ search time increase and their
10bargaining position worsen, leading to lower prices. This price drop is due to illiquidity, as
agents are risk neutral.4
Importantly, with liquidity-adjusted risk management, the increased search time for sell-
ers means that the risk over the expected liquidation period rises, thus further tightening
the risk-management constraint, further reducing positions, further increasing search times,
and so on.
This multiplier also increases the sensitivity of the economy with liquidity-adjusted risk
management to the other shocks (b)–(e). Indeed, a lower risk limit (b) is equivalent to a
higher dividend risk. The “liquidity shocks” (c)–(e) do not aﬀect the equilibrium position ¯ θ
with simple risk management, but they do increase the sellers’ search times and reduce prices.
With liquidity-adjusted risk management, these liquidity shocks reduce security positions,
too, because of increased search times and, as explained above, a multiplier eﬀect arises.
The multiplier arising from the feedback between trading liquidity and risk management
clearly magniﬁes the eﬀects on liquidity and prices of changes in the economic environment.
Our steady-state model illustrate this point using comparative static analysis that essentially
compares across economies. Similar results would arise in the time series of a single economy
if there was random variation in the model characteristic, e.g., parameters switched in a
Markov chain as in Duﬃe, Gˆ arleanu, and Pedersen (2007). In the context of such time-series
variation, our multiplier eﬀect can generate the abrupt changes in prices and selling times
that characterize crises.




λu+λd, a condition that is satisﬁed is all our examples. (When Θ
¯ θ > λu
λu+λd, the Walrasian price is X−δ
r .)
11We illustrate our model with a numerical example in which λ = 100, r = 10%, X0 = 1,
λd = 0.2, λu = 2, δ = 3, q = 0.5, Θ = 1, and ¯ σ = 1. Figure 1 shows how prices (right panel)
and sellers’ expected search times (left panel) depend on asset volatility. The solid line shows
this for liquidity-adjusted risk management and the dashed for simple risk management with
τ = 0.0086, which is chosen so that the risk management schemes are identical for σX = 30%.
Search times increase and prices decrease with volatility. Importantly, these sensitivities are
stronger (i.e., the curves are steeper) with liquidity-adjusted risk management due to the
interaction between market liquidity (i.e., search times) and risk management.
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12A Appendix
Steady-State Distribution of Agent Types:
The steady-state distribution of agent types is given by the following system of equations.
The economic intuition for these equations is discussed in connection with Equation (5) in
the paper.
(A.1)
0 = ˙ µlo(t) = −2λµhn(t)µlo(t) − λuµlo(t) + λdµho(t)
0 = ˙ µhn(t) = −2λµhn(t)µlo(t) − λdµhn(t) + λuµln(t)
0 = ˙ µho(t) = 2λµhn(t)µlo(t) − λdµho(t) + λuµlo(t)
0 = ˙ µln(t) = 2λµhn(t)µlo(t) − λuµln(t) + λdµhn(t).
Two of the equations in (A.1) are redundant, so that, together with (3)–(4), (A.1) forms a






















We use below the following result, which follows from calculations in Duﬃe, Gˆ arleanu,
and Pedersen (2007).
Lemma 3 If ¯ θ ≥ Θ, the system of equations (3), (4), and (A.1) has a unique solution in
[0,1]4. The steady-state fraction of sellers µlo increases with λd and decreases with λu, while
the fraction of buyers µhn decreases with λd and increases with λu. Both µlo and µhn decrease
with the meeting intensity λ. Furthermore, µlo increases, while µhn decreases with ¯ θ.
13Proof of Proposition 1:
The value function coeﬃcients are given by
0 = rvlo − λu(vho − vlo) − 2λµhn(p − vlo + vln) + δ
0 = rvln − λu(vhn − vln)
0 = rvho − λd(vlo − vho) (A.3)
0 = rvhn − λd(vln − vhn) − 2λµho(vho − vhn − p)
p = (vlo − vln)(1 − q) + (vho − vhn)q.
The ﬁrst equation means that an agent of type lo has a zero change in steady-state utility.
The change in his utility is due to opportunity cost −rvlo, expected change in intrinsic-type
λu(vho − vlo), trade 2λµhn(p − vlo + vln), and holding cost −δ. The next three equations are




r(1 − q) + λd + 2λµlo(1 − q)
r + λd + 2λµlo(1 − q) + λu + 2λµhnq
. (A.4)
Given the dependence of P(Xt) on Xt, it is immediate that




14for constant τ. If τ is randomly distributed with constant arrival intensity λµhn,















and it is clear that, when the VaR constraint (2) binds, the equilibrium holding θ is given
by (9) or (10), depending on the nature of risk management.
￿
Proof of Proposition 2: The equilibrium with the two kinds of risk management is given
by fi(¯ θ) = r¯ σ
σX, where f0(¯ θ) = ¯ θ
√
τ and f1(¯ θ) =
¯ θ √
2λµhn(¯ θ). Clearly, f0 = f1 when τ = 1
2λµhn,
so that the two equilibria are identical.
The sensitivity ¯ θ′ of the equilibrium position ¯ θ to the ratio ¯ σ
σX is given by f′
i¯ θ′ = r. With
simple risk management, it is clear that f′
0 > 0, so that the equilibrium position ¯ θ decreases
if the volatility σX increases or the risk limit ¯ σ decreases. A decreasing ¯ θ leads, in turn,
to an increasing expected search time for sellers (2λµhn)−1 and a decreasing price, because
∂µhn/∂¯ θ > 0 and ∂µlo/∂¯ θ < 0, as stated by Lemma 3.
With liquidity-adjusted risk management, f′
1 > 0 by the deﬁnition of a stable equilibrium,
and, since ∂µhn/∂¯ θ > 0, f′
1 < f′
0. Hence, with liquidity-adjusted risk management, the eﬀects
of σX on the equilibrium quantities are larger in absolute value and of the same sign as with
simple risk management. A stable equilibrium exists because f1 < ∞ on (Θ,∞), while
limx→Θ f1(x) = limx→∞ f1(x) = ∞, given that µhn(Θ) = 0 and limx→∞ µhn(x) > 0.






































which can be solved for d¯ θ
dλ.
With simple risk management, it follows that d¯ θ




∂µhn = 0. With liquidity-
adjusted risk management, d¯ θ








d¯ θ > 0 for a stable equilibrium.






∂λ < 0, which holds because
d(λµhn)
dλ > 0, as can be
shown based on (A.2). Since
∂f1
∂λ < 0, the result on selling times also obtains.












The ﬁrst term gives the impact with simple risk management, while the second captures the
additional impact introduced by adjusting risk management to liquidity. Since ∂P
∂¯ θ > 0 from
Proposition 1 and (A.2) (a complete proof can be given along the lines of Duﬃe, Gˆ arleanu,
and Pedersen (2007)), the second term has the same sign as d¯ θ
dλ. This sign was shown above
to be positive, as is the sign of ∂P
∂λ. The total eﬀect is therefore larger with risk-adjusted risk
management.
Similar reasoning establishes the results concerning the dependence on λd and λu.
￿
16